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1. Introduction 
The overcome of the bipolar dynamics between the Soviet and the American 
bloc has led to an increasing concern about the study of security in regional 
geopolitical environment. Thus, the Copenhagen School3 proposed new tools to 
analyze and understand the relations between states within the framework of 
European security itself, which distinguishes it from the traditional theories of 
international relations, most of them from North America. The Copenhagen 
School believes that the phenomena produced by the end of the Cold War and 
the globalization process are not included or covered by the dominant models 
on security and there is a need to redefine some of the concepts used so far. 
Several contributions to research on security have been made by this 
school. First, the definition of it as a multidimensional concept, invoking 
different objects related to security that vary according to context, being in 
certain circumstances the State, or individuals or social groups in others. 
Second, the Theory of Regional Security Complexes, which evaluates the very 
approach to the constituted unit of analysis: a complex refers to a group of 
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states whose perceptions of safety are common and whose list of friends and 
enemies are shared. Neorealism studied the international system and its 
dynamics as a basic unit of analysis, but this has been criticized by the 
Copenhagen School, which put emphasis on the study of the subsystems that 
were cajoled by the bipolar system for a long time. It also defines the 
subsystems as complexes of states with certain independence of the overall 
system due to the intensity of their interactions. 
In this sense, this school recognizes the importance of analyzing the 
dynamics of states not only under systemic actors, but primarily regional, 
considering that the interdependence of states comprising a region is so 
profound that one cannot study the security of just one state while ignoring the 
security of a neighbor (Buzan 1992). The idea of security complexes refers to a 
set of states that not only form a natural block and a distinct historical and 
cultural circle, but also have higher security challenges externally than 
internally. Hence, their security perspectives tend to converge. 
As our area of interest comprises the bilateral relationship between 
Argentina and Brazil, we approach a limited regional subsystem and, in this 
sense, we believe that the alternative approach of Cooperative Security is the 
most appropriate since it postulates the progressive integration and 
development of mutual trust measures4 as elements that generate mechanisms 
for long-term cooperation. Thus, the aim of this article is to review the nuclear 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil since the restoration of democracy 
and to analyze whether it can be considered a process of Cooperative Security. 
Consequently, the hypothesis guiding this work is based on the generation of a 
process of Cooperative Security between Argentina and Brazil by the hands of 
Confidence-Building Measures held between these two countries from the 
restoration of democracy in Argentina until 2011. 
According to Hardy Videla (2003, 3), "Cooperative Security seeks to 
achieve security through institutionalized consent among international actors 
                                                 
4 We understand Mutual Trust Measures not only as bilateral and multilateral measures that intennd to 
prevent crisis and conflicts situations, but also actions that help the communication between actors, 
generating a comprehensive framework that aims the perception of immediate threats and avoids risks. 
They are the corollary of a political will of two or more states that attempt to create alternatives to 
solve a problem, which can be developed into conflict without these measures just through an 
interpretation error. 
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involved in the system. [...] It asssumes that the securitarian objectives of the 
partners have been identified as common and compatible, enabling the 
establishment of cooperation between the parties to achieve them." Firstly, this 
means to put emphasis on prevention as an enduring dynamics overtime and, 
secondly, the abandonment of unilateral practices, recognizing the inability of a 
state to increase its security in isolation. This model is somehow intended as a 
proposal that overcomes the weaknesses of Collective Security. 
The same author states that the concept of Cooperative Security can be 
also applied bilaterally, as long as the two countries share a vision for future 
expansion. This is where our research identify a clearer sense, as we refer to the 
bilateral dynamics between Argentina and Brazil not as an isolated issue, but as 
part of a process that tends to be spread to other countries in the region. 
Fontana defines Cooperative Security as a change of mentality, a 
transformation in the perception of others and their neighbors, which is based 
on trust and transparency. "This is not built only by unprecedented 
mechanisms, but largely on the basis of elements that largely exist, such as 
agreements, treaties or established routines" (quoted in Milanese 2005, 45). In 
this sense, Argentina and Brazil are developing a bilateral link on the subject, 
once incipient under military rule, but that have been deepening over the 
decades of democracy. The return of democracy was the ideal period to mend 
ties with countries that became embroiled in a logic of rivalry and distrust 
throughout the de facto administrations. 
In this regard, Argentina and Brazil historically went through a 
situation of rivalry, but their relations found their most tense peak with the 
start of nuclear development in both countries during the 1950s. It is for this 
reason that we limited our study on the process of Cooperative Security to 
Confidence-Building Measures to the strictly nuclear field, since we believe that 
progresses in this technology generated the moment of greatest tension between 
the two countries, but at the same time it was the ambit where the first 
Confidence-Building Measures that would culminate in the consolidation of this 
process were established. 
The aforementioned tradition of rivalry was manifested mainly through 
two key events during the military regimes. On the one hand, in the La Plata 
Basin, which presented the shared waters of the Paraná River as a scenario, 
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where some misunderstandings occurred in the context of construction of the 
Itaipu (Brazil) and Corpus (Argentina) dams during the 1970s. The kickoff to 
reverse this situation occurred with the signing of the Tripartite Treaty in 1979. 
On the other hand, this competition was also evident through the nuclear and 
arms race, which first took the path of cooperation after the signature of the 
Bilateral Cooperation Agreement for the Development and Application of 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1980. As from the 1980s, this rivalry 
disappears due to the re-democratization process in both countries that 
complements the various regional integration mechanisms, especially the 
MERCOSUR, among other factors. 
 
 
2. Antecedents of Nuclear Development in Argentina and Brazil 
In the 21st century, the importance of nuclear development has increased due to 
several factors such as the broad technological development, the increasing 
demands for diversification of energy sources, new threats to international 
security, among others. In turn, especially for developing countries, the control 
of this resource is an international symbol of power, and in many cases a 
bargaining chip before more powerful states. This leads us to make a brief 
analysis and description of nuclear developments in Argentina and Brazil. 
 
2.1. Argentine Nuclear Development 
Regarding Argentina, we can say that progress in the nuclear field is one of the 
most advanced in the region and the world, a result of sixty years of national 
efforts. But the Argentine case is also particular due to the use of their own 
potential, with almost no external cooperation, allowing the development of 
purely national technology; and in those cases in which Argentina unavoidably 
had to resort to foreign companies through trade agreements, Argentina 
actively participated in the execution of the works. However, this exclusive 
development was driven by events like the distrust generated by nuclear 
advances, since foreign countries refused to provide technical cooperation and 
equipment. 
According to Ornstein (2010), one can briefly describe the history of 
Argentine nuclear development in three stages: a first phase, formative, 
extending from 1950-1958; a second, transitional, spanning 1959-1967; and a 
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third, of consolidation, from 1968 until the departure of the military 
dictatorship in 1982; and a fourth and last phase, between the restoration of 
democracy and the late-1990s. This last stage was added to this section, but will 
be discussed later. 
The first stage takes as its starting point the creation of the National 
Comission of Atomic Energy (Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, CNEA, in 
Spanish). With the creation of CNEA in 1950 and the installation of its first 
laboratories in 1965, an organic evolution of nuclear energy in the country 
begins. Thus, a first stage that lasted almost until the end of the decade found 
its beginning, which was mainly dedicated to the training of specialized 
personnel. To this end, several professionals studied in European and American 
laboratories and the visit of many foreign specialists was encouraged. From the 
beginning, it was a policy of CNEA to domestically produce the fuel elements to 
supply reactors to be built. From 1957 onwards, all fuel elements for research 
reactors that successively entered operation were designed and manufactured in 
the CNEA. Undoubtedly, the most significant event of this stage was the 
construction of the country's first experimental reactor. This reactor was the 
first of Argentine origin and also the first to operate in Latin America, which 
was a milestone in the history of nuclear power in the region. This experience 
allowed the realization of other more complex projects. 
Another event that distinguishes this stage of nuclear development 
began in 1952 with uranium mining. The study of the Argentine territory for 
the purpose of determining its nuclear mineral wealth was also one of the first 
concerns of the CNEA. It was how uranium mining began and, additionally, a 
pilot plant for the production of metallic uranium through calciothermy was 
built in 1953 (Ornstein 2010). Moreover, the systematic study of uranium 
mining stocks began in 1955. 
In the second stage of transition, CNEA becomes a body in charge of 
defining the application of nuclear energy programs. Prodution and research 
reactors are designed throughout this period, and a plant for the specific 
production of radioisotopes is built. These initiatives came to cover 90% of the 
national energy demand in the 1980s and allowed the exports to countries of the 
region. The successful experience of those years enabled many enterprises, like 
the export of reactors. 
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The beginning of the third period starts in 1968 and ends with the end 
of the National Reconstruction Process (Proceso de Reconstrucción Nacional, in 
Spanish) in 1982. At this stage, Argentina began its activities in the nuclear 
power ambit, dominating the nuclear fuel cycle and the production of heavy 
water, which allowed ensuring the supply of these inputs to nuclear power 
plants. This phase is characterized by the construction of the first nuclear plant 
Atucha I in 1968, the first nuclear facility in Latin America for the production 
of electricity. In 1973, the construction of the second nuclear plant Embalse 
began. The construction of the third plant, Atucha II, started the following 
year5. 
In 1977, objectives and policies were defined in order to achieve self-
sufficiency in a program that would serve national interests. These interests 
involved, first, meeting future electricity demand combining hydroelectric and 
nuclear sources and, on the other hand, obtaining maximum autonomy in the 
use of this energy source. Thus, in 1979 the government approved the Nuclear 
Plan, which consisted of the installation of four nuclear power plants and an 
industrial plant of heavy water production. However, the plan was delayed and 
later abandoned due to the economic crisis that affected the country. Another 
factor was the discovery of significant gas reserves and the increase of the 
supply of thermal energy. The stage that included the military dictatorship 
(1976-1983) accelerated nuclear development. The fragility of the economy and 
the Argentine political system did not represent an obstacle for the regime to 
significantly increase the budget of the nuclear ambit. Apart from this paradox, 
plans to complete the fuel cycle went ahead regardless of international pressure, 
especially from the United States. We affirm it because the Argentine plan was 
carried on throughout an international context marked by a process of 
corporatization of countries that exported nuclear technology and of 
reassessment of their strategies from the oil crisis and the Indian nuclear test in 
May 1974. 
                                                 
5 It is worth to mention that the Atucha II plant is not already operational. 
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While pressures were increasing, CNA and INVAP6 launched in 1978 
the secret uranium enrichment program. As suggested by Hurtado de Mendoza 
(2009), we believe that one of the geopolitical motivations of regime was, on the 
one hand, the 1973 Itaipu Treaty signed between Brazil and Paraguay that 
allowed the construction of a dam on the Paraná River and, on the other, the 
1975 agreement between Brazil and West Germany on technology transfer. 
In November 1983, the announcement that Argentina had created a 
uranium enrichment plant, the Pilcaniyeu Project, was formalized, marking the 
highest point of the Argentine nuclear program. Here the fourth and final phase 
begins. While the international arena expected the arrival of Alfonsín and the 
restoration of democracy would change the country’s position on its nuclear 
program, it quickly went disillusioned. The “nuclear culture” was not wholly 
owned by the military, but was part of an Argentine tradition manifested in 
international forums, where the country opposed the discriminatory nature of 
the nonproliferation treaties. The downturn and budget cuts that CNA received 
were a result of the economic crisis facing Argentina, and not of a policy of 
opposition to independent nuclear development. 
The 1990s were of an impasse in nuclear activity; most businesses were 
privatized or closed. Moreover, and in line with the new model of international 
insertion of the country, Argentina acceded to many international regimes like 
Missile Control Technology Regime (MCTR); the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom); the Australian Group control of 
chemical and biological weapons; and joined the Agency for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL, in Spanish). 
Argentina also ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1994 and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) a year later. It disabled its nuclear development. Thus, it leaves 
behind a historical critical attitude of Argentina diplomacy towards the 
discriminatory nature of the measures of disarmament and nonproliferation 
adopted in international forums, as well as its claim for the right to a peaceful 
nuclear development held since the 1940s. 
                                                 
6 INVAP is a high-technology company created in 1976 dedicated to designing, integrating and building 
plants, equipments and devices in high-complexity areas, like nuclear energy, space technology, 
industrial technology and scientifical and medical equipments. 
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It is just during the governments of Nestor (2003- 2007) and Cristina 
Kirchner (2007-2011)7 that the Argentine nuclear project seems to be 
reinvigorated. Since the launching in 2006 of the works of the third Atucha II 
nuclear plant, until the beginning of the studies for the construction of a fourth 
nuclear power plant and resuming production of enriched uranium that had 
been interrupted in the 1980s; interest in advance is demonstrated. In March 
2009, a draft bill was sent, and approved months later by the Congress. It 
granted a special regime for the development of the Argentine Nuclear Plan, 
aiming reactivation as a strategic issue, nuclear power generation and 
development of applications and services of nuclear energy in health, industry 
and scientific activity sectors. Within this context lays the 2006 decree, which 
decided the launch of Atucha II, and another decree of the same year, which 
declared the construction and commissioning of the Reactor Prototype CAREM 
for nuclear power generation as of national interest. 
In recent years, the Argentine nuclear project looks outside: the export 
of nuclear energy constitutes one of the primary objectives of the Argentine 
commercial foreign policy, and the emphasis on promoting the export of nuclear 
technology responds to the goal of adding value and diversifying Argentine 
exports. 
 
2.2. Brazilian Nuclear Development 
As in the Argentine case, the history of Brazilian nuclear development can also 
be divided into four stages, according to the classification made by Cubillos 
Meza (2008). First, the “ independent phase” (1945-1953). Second, the period of 
“cooperation with the United States” (1954-1966). The third is the “active 
phase” (1967-1978). And, finally, the “revisionist phase” (1979-2011). 
During the first phase, the founding milestone is the creation of the 
National Council for Research (Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas, CNPq, in 
Portuguese) and the Brazilian Center for Physical Researches (Conselho 
Brasileiro de Pesquisas Físicas, CBPF, in Portuguese). The CNPq was dedicated 
to scientific and technological research and training for specialists in this type of 
                                                 
7 First mandate. 
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energy until 1956, thus institutionalizing basic research on the subject and 
marking the end of the first stage. 
The second phase, in cooperation with the United States, begins with 
the signing of a bilateral treaty based on the delivery of three research reactors 
and in training staff. The link with the Northern country has its antecedent on 
the allied condition of Brazil during World War II, as well as Brazilian role as 
uranium exporter. We must remember that a bilateral agreement on financial 
and technical support for the implementation of projects and the construction 
and operation of reactors, which was kept secret, had already been signed in 
1945. 
In this context, Brazil justified its interest on nuclear technology by the 
growing energy demand, which was boosted by economic growth. So far, we see 
that during the Vargas government (1951-1954) the Atomic Energy Program 
was aimed at the creation and the consolidation of a research infrastructure. 
During the 1960s, its activities were directed to building reactors and 
developing the fuel cycle. 
Much of what has been built ever since is rooted in the Kubitschek 
administration (1956-1961). Under the “Guidelines for Atomic Energy Policy”, 
there was the support for the creation of the National Comission for Nuclear 
Energy (Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear, CNEN, in Portuguese) on the 
premise of its peaceful use. The agency was in charge of managing the nuclear 
program as a whole, since the formation of human resources to the control of 
materials. From 1956, and for four years, an analysis on the uranium resources 
possessed by Brazil was put forth alongside the United States. In this context, 
it is necessary to note that the Latin American country was still receiving 
research reactors from the United States. 
During the governments of Quadros (January-August 1961) and 
Goulart8 (1961-1964), an approach was attempted to obtain a heavy water 
reactor from France, stepping away from the United States, but this process 
was interrupted by the 1964 military Coup d’état. After the coup, the National 
                                                 
8 Goulart was able to change the national policy on nuclear energy through the Act 4118 of August 27, 
1962. The act decreed the monopoly on uranium and nuclear material. For its part, CNEN was 
consolidated as an autharchic entity in federal level, obtaining administrative and financial 
authonomy, directly subordianted to the nation’s Executive Power. 
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Security Council was almost entirely composed of military, excluding the 
scientific considerations from decision-making. In turn, there was an increase in 
investments for projects to build nuclear power plants. 
The arrival of the most active phase of nuclear progress came at the 
hands of the National Security Doctrine. In 1967, during the Castelo Branco 
administration, the CNEN was transferred to the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. In 1974, U.S. support as nuclear supplier began to erode, generating 
approaches to other countries. In this sense, an important step was the 1975 
agreement with West Germany that finally ended the autonomous development 
process for the production of nuclear energy. It was due in part to the 
agreements with the United States, which did not commit this country to the 
transfer of knowledge on sensitive parts of the fuel cycle, especially enrichment 
and reprocessing, and this threatened the inauguration of Angra I, whose 
construction and operation began in 1972 and 1985, respectively. 
Figueiredo administration (1979-1985) inaugrated the last stage, 
characterized by the slowdown in the nuclear program and by a shift of 
resources to more local research efforts, away from the massive transfer of 
technology. This break on development was due to financial difficulties, 
technical problems and the criticism from public opinion. However, we can not 
ignore the fact that uranium enrichment was conducted secretly in 1978. The 
decision to continue building the Resende enrichment plant can be seen as a 
response to the Argentine developments in the control of the nuclear cycle. The 
project managed to be materialized only in 1982. In 1986, a committee in 
charge of evaluating the delay of Brazilian nuclear cycle was created, through 
which some causes, such as a decrease of energy demand and of the national 
GDP were identified. These difficulties broadened the dependence on external 
supplies of enriched uranium and prevented the control of the nuclear fuel cycle 
from being reached. 
Thus, the official nuclear program was delayed as a consequence of the 
agreement with West Germany, initiating a parallel, secret initiative 
undertaken by the Armed Forces. Unlike Argentina, where the nuclear program 
was transferred to civilian hands with the return of democracy, this evidences 
that in Brazil it was the military who were controlling the process of decision-
making in this area. 
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The 1990s came to reverse a fact that had characterized not only Brazil, 
but also Argentina. Though Brazil uttered its peaceful ends since the beginning 
of its nuclear development, it refrained from signing the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). It was Cardoso who urged the Congress for approval, stating 
that it was necessary to review the position of the country, since its refusal 
would condemn it to international isolation. Thus, Brazil signed the treaty in 
1998. 
During President Lula da Silva administration, the National Defense 
Strategy was adopted. It proposed the modernization of the Armed Forces, 
emphasizing three sectors of strategic importance: space, cybernetic and 
nuclear. Hence, it was also decided to create the Committee for the 
Development of the Brazilian Nuclear Program, responsible for establishing its 
basic lines and objectives, and monitoring its implementation. In recent years, 
Brazil attempted to increase aerospace capabilities, launched a program for the 
construction of a nuclear submarine in association with France and signed an 
agreement for the production of intercontinental cruise missiles with China and 
Russia. In 2010, it began the construction of Angra III, which is expected to be 
operational by 2015. With these projects, Brazil seeks to increase its production 
of nuclear energy and diversify its energy sources. Another key factor in this 
new phase was the appointment of Nelson Jobim to the Ministry of Defence in 
2007, who gave to this ministry a more agile dynamic, reassessing security as an 
essential agent for international negotiation. A clear example of this policy was 
the launch of the National Defense Strategy in 2008, which emphasizes progress 
toward building a defense industry that pushes forward the country’s industrial 
and technological development. In this sense, Brazil began to build a nuclear 
submarine and to reequip ground and air forces. 
Given these events, arises a question that has to do with the 
constitution of Brazil as a regional power able to hinder the strengthening of 
cooperative action and the building of mutual trust. Del Pilar (2010) believes 
that South America, more than a geographical reality, is a Brazilian geopolitical 
project necessary for the country to exercise the hegemony that was 
strengthened with the creation of the “South Americanization doctrine of the 
regional foreign policy of Brazil” during the Lula administration. This very 
author argues that Brazil has followed three strategic parameters for position 
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itself in international and regional scenarios. The first involves the formation of 
strategic partnerships for the military buildup that led the country to sign 
defense agreements with countries not only in Latin America, but in Europe, 
Asia and Africa – the objective was the technology exchange to expand its own 
defense industry. The second responds to the need for exporting military 
equipment surpassing its own supplying. In order to fulfill this parameter, 
many companies were created, like AVIBRAS for aerospace industry, IMBEL 
(Military Equipment Industry of Brazil), EMGEPRON (Management 
Company for Naval Projects), EMBRAER (Brazilian Aeronautical Company) 
and CBC (Brazilian Company of Cartridges). The third parameter was to 
convert military weaknesses into strengths. In order to do it, Brazil invested 
heavily in the renovation of the Armed Forces. In short, Brazil's transition to 
regional leadership has used soft and hard power resources. In the first case, we 
can mention the creation of MERCOSUR and UNASUR, besides the 
participation in solving regional political crises in neighbor states. 
Finally, every nuclear project responds to a national development 
model that ultimately reveals a model of country inspired by political and 
economic ideals in force in a determined space-time, local and international 
context. On our summary of the nuclear dynamics in both countries, we were 
able to prove that military rules have promoted this activity, but in a climate of 
rivalry and distrust among neighbors. The return of democracy not only led to 
the growth of the nation in political terms, but in our case study is generating a 
process of Cooperative Security to make the work on both sides of the border 
more transparent. 
 
 
3. Mutual Trust Measures after the Return of Democracy 
In the mark of its foreign policy, Alfonsín administration tried to reverse the 
country’s international image that had been so damaged by the military regime 
that preceded it. Issues such as external debt, the border conflict with Chile and 
the Falklands War were major challenges for democratic governance. Based on 
these legacy issues, the foreign policy goals had to do with the recovery of the 
external prestige, mechanisms for the protection of democracy and the solution 
of structural problems of development. 
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On defense and security, one of the pillars of its foreign policy was the 
condemnation of the arms race, consistent with the ethical principles of idealism 
that were manifested through participation in the G6, the transfer of the 
control of CNEA to civilian hands and the pursuit of nuclear cooperation. 
However, the external actions in this area were not exempt of contradictions, 
such as the non-adherence to the Tlatelolco Treaty, the non-ratification of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the continuation of the Cóndor II project. 
The return of democracy to the region brought several changes, 
including increased political and economic cooperation, and also the overcome 
of old suspicions and misgivings among South American countries, especially 
Argentina and Brazil. As evidence, 24 protocols were signed between the two 
countries between 1986 and 1989, covering various areas of cooperation. Also 
the creation of integration processes, such as MERCOSUR, somehow 
legitimized political cooperation in the field of security. In this framework, it is 
possible to detect common positions of member states in terms of security and 
defense, and definitions of the various threats. 
This new phase of nuclear cooperation was acquiring unprecedented 
political dimension through the presidential visits of Alfonsín and Sarney, and 
of technical teams to nuclear facilities in each country with the 
institutionalization of working groups and regular meetings. At the same time, 
the Nuclear Commissions of both countries underwent a restructuring, an 
“institutional demilitarization” (Brigagão and Valle Fonrouge 1999, 11). The 
series of bilateral agreements begins with the Joint Declaration on Nuclear 
Policy of Foz do Iguaçu, signed in November 1985. This agreement is the 
starting point for a series of political agreements that presents the primary 
stage of cooperation. According to Milanese (2005), it is the foundational 
moment of cooperation between the two countries, the first step of a 
transcendent confidence in bilateral ties. It is a statement that contains 
multiple axes and enables both states to face difficulties in the international 
supply of equipment, materials and nuclear fuels. It can be interpreted as an 
effort toward technological autonomy through the promotion of atomic energy. 
The Joint Declaration is the first step toward building a cooperative security 
process. 
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A second instrument was the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy of 
Brasilia, signed in December 1986. Through this instrument, there was an 
attempt to overcome the obstacles of integration in order to bring transparency 
through the exchange of views and policy coordination positions in multilateral 
fora. 
A third instrument was the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy of 
Viedma, signed in July 1987. This document was the occasion for the visit of 
President Sarney to the Pilcaniyeu isotope separation plant, which highlighted 
the construction of an important measure of confidence. This was evident in the 
words of the president of Brazil to the newspaper Clarin on July 18, 1987 “[...] 
it is the first in the world that a head of state was invited by another head of 
state to visit a uranium enrichment plant, which by its nature is a secret 
facility” (quoted in Milanese 2005, 150. Our translation.). 
The Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Iperó was signed in the 
following year. This led to the visit of President Alfonsín to the experimental 
center Aramar, which belonged to the Brazilian Navy and where a nuclear 
submarine was being built. On this occasion, a stable and functioning schedule 
of meetings was set. In November of the same year, Sarney visited the 
Radiochemical Processing Laboratory of the National Atomic Energy 
Commission (CNEA) for the fuel production for the Atucha I power plant and 
the heavy water reactor of Embalse. Result of the visit was the Joint 
Declaration on Nuclear Policy of Ezeiza. Although the reasons for this statement 
are almost identical to the previous ones and do seem redundant, it served to 
reaffirm the commitment between the two states for the exclusively peaceful 
use of nuclear energy. 
The aforementioned set of bilateral nuclear agreements annulled the 
nuclear issue in terms of obstacles to bilateral ties. This is confirmed by the 
creation of MERCOSUR, through the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991, which not 
only definitively eliminated the chances of a strategic conflict, but also 
extended cooperation in integrating Uruguay and Paraguay to this process. 
In the 1990s, Carlos Menem assumed the presidency of Argentina in an 
external context marked by the end of the East-West confrontation. In this 
context, the objectives of the Argentine foreign policy proposed overcoming the 
internal economic crisis, having a high-profile before international financial 
institutions and private banks, and finding the way for the reintegration into 
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economic and trade globalization. Under these assumptions, the government 
adapted its foreign policy to the national interest defined in economic terms. 
This foreign policy found its theoretical basis in the Peripheral Realism of 
Escudé, which advised, among other things, not confronting the great powers, 
actively participating of international regimes, and implementing a policy of 
disarmament involving the adhesion to certain bilateral and multilateral 
instruments. 
It is in this context that one should understand some decisions on 
security made by this administration, like the adhesion to international regimes 
such as MCTR, the CoCom, the Australian Group of control of chemical and 
biological weapons, and the OPANAL, or the ratification of Tlatelolco and the 
NPT, among others. This axis of its foreign policy was complemented by 
participation in international and peacekeeping operations, as well as by the 
abandonment of policies for autonomous development in sensitive areas, like 
the Cóndor II project: a sort of demilitarization of diplomacy. 
At this time, Brazil sought greater projection in multilateral areas with 
a more universalist spirit, while Argentina took a more Westernized and north-
aligned posture. In this sense, Brazil was presented as the benchmark of an 
essentially economic alliance. However, many bilateral instruments were 
implemented in this decade. 
The first instrument institutionalized this government was the 
Argentine-Brazilian Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy of Foz do Iguaçu 
signed in November 1990, which established new bases for the definite insertion 
into the global structure of nuclear material through the establishment of a 
Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and 
Installations (Sistema Común de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales e 
Instalación Nucleares, SCCC, in Spanish), whose goal was that both countries 
developed peaceful activities, raising the need to negotiate amendments to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the entry into force of the Tlatelolco 
Treaty in both countries. 
The establishment of SCCC soon raised the need for a mechanism or 
institution responsible for its implementation. The latter could be implemented 
through the Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Argentina and 
the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil on the Exclusively Peaceful 
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Use of Nuclear Energy, signed in the city of Guadalajara on July 18, 1991. Also 
known as the Guadalajara Agreement, this instrument allowed the creation of 
Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Controlling of Nuclear 
Materials (Agencia Brasileño Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales 
Nucleares, ABACC). It was responsibility of ABACC the administration and 
implementation of the SCCC. 
Another breakthrough was the Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Government of Argentina and the Government of the Federative Republic of 
Brazil for Consultation and Coordination, signed in April 1997. Its aim was the 
establishment of a permanent mechanism for consultation and coordination for 
the strengthening of bilateral relations in defense and international security. It 
oversees the examination, evaluation, implementation and monitoring of 
defense and security issues of mutual interest related to military equipment and 
training, joint military exercises, among others. 
In this sense, one observes the integrating engagement of both 
countries, which constitutes a security process. Within this process, the 
arrangements for the peaceful use of nuclear energy were essential, since they 
were established as the first measures of confidence that helped starting it up. 
In this context, the frequency of exchanges between institutions, coupled with 
the high-level political dialogue led to profound and positive changes in mutual 
perceptions. 
Moreover, two treaties of great significance for both Argentina and 
Brazil are the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Both 
countries adhered these treaties during the 1990s and, therefore, the agreements 
deserve a separate paragraph. The Tlatelolco Treaty, or Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, was signed 
in 1967, and its goal is the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the region. To 
achieve its objective, it proposes outlawing production, storage, introduction or 
stationing of nuclear weapons in the region, except for the right to develop 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Argentina signed the Treaty but its 
Congress did not ratify it, arguing that the mechanisms of control system 
established to prevent the proliferation did not ensure an adequate protection 
for industrial secrets, affecting the national nuclear technologies and “(...) it 
established distinctions between the signatories, characterizing a position 
contrary to the principle of legal equality of members states” (Brigagão and 
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Valle Fonrouge 1999, 13. Our translation.). These arguments contributed to 
Argentina and Brazil to pass long years without a full and unreserved adherence 
to the treaty, though they actively participated of the creation of it. The 
adhesive process began in 1992, when both countries presented a set of 
subsequently adopted amendments at the conference of the OPANAL, with the 
aim of enabling the full entry into force of this regional legal regime. Argentina 
and Brazil, original signers of the Treaty, ratified it in 1994. 
On the other hand, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) guided 
Argentina and Brazil through different paths and was ratified recently, in 1995 
and 1998, respectively. Since its inception, the two countries stood out in 
international forum for their persistent opposition because of the discriminatory 
nature of the treaty and its restriction to the development of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes by developing states that ratified it. This attitude remained 
unchanged until the 1990s, when both countries would ratify it, although with 
different paces. According to Waisman (2010), this was because in Argentina 
civilian control over the military system is greater than in Brazil, where 
military sectors showed strong opposition to the NPT. 
After a decade of a Menemista government, the Alianza formed by the 
radicalismo and the Frepaso came to power. Affirming to be a different model 
than the precedent neoliberal project, it could not reverse the consequences of 
those policies. After the assumption of De la Rúa, the country faced a large 
fiscal deficit, a considerable foreign debt and a huge dependence on 
international capital markets. Given the critical situation, Alianza ended up 
applying adjustment measures and thus slowing economic recovery. The 
instability of policies at the domestic level had its counterpart in international 
politics. According to Miranda (2003), we can characterize the foreign policy of 
this period through elements such as discontinuation due to confusing and 
contradictory actions; the inefficiency in handling context changes and 
adapting; and the instability. 
In this period, the government will seek the relaunching of 
MERCOSUR and the deepening of ties with Brazil. However, we can say that 
the latter is a misperception by the Argentina government, since Brazil was 
immersed in their domestic problems and was not interested in consolidating 
the MERCOSUR, on the contrary, it intended that Argentina only endorsed its 
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initiatives. Proof of this is the First Summit of South American Presidents, held 
in Brasilia in 2000, where President Fernando Henrique Cardoso claimed the 
regional integration through the complementation of MERCOSUR and CAN, 
proposing a South American free trade area. This fact marks the Brazilian 
leadership at the time when offering its market to the region in exchange for 
recognition of its strategic importance, resulting in Argentina’s secondary role. 
In 2003, Néstor Kirchner took office after winning just 22% of the 
votes. It was a government with little legitimacy in tune with the crisis of 
representation of Argentina at that time. During these events, it is not difficult 
to suppose that foreign policy was used as an instrument to domestic 
legitimization, at least until 2005. This scenario was transformed when the 
ruling party won enough votes in the 2005 legislative elections, allowing it to 
have more popular support. There are several hypotheses about the foreign 
policy of Néstor Kirchner. Both Llenderrozas (2006) and De la Balze (2010) 
interpret it as a tool for internal legitimacy, while others, like Simonoff (2009) 
believe it was a double standard policy, where there were rhetorically 
revindicative purposes, but the necessary concessions were hidden. It is not our 
goal to develop a detailed analysis of this issue, but we regard as essential to 
understand that this administration tried to differentiate itself from the others, 
as we can observe a return to Latin America and a decline in the “carnal 
relations” with the United States. 
In an international context marked by mistrust due to the declaration 
of default and the indifference of some states in the region due to the political 
alignment of Argentina to the U.S. Department of State’s objectives during the 
previous decade, a retake of the regional policy was attempted by deepening ties 
with Brazil. This objective intended to regain some credibility when 
renegotiating the debt with international financial institutions and private 
creditors. The relationship with Brazil during the first Kirchner mandate was 
based on the attempt to deepen MERCOSUR. The bilateral relationship 
fluctuated between political cooperation supported by permanent consultations 
and coordination of positions in international forums, and trade conflicts due to 
nontariff restrictions and export subsidies by Brazil. However, these differences 
did not dampen cooperation. 
On the other hand, the relationship with Brazil allowed Argentina to 
resume a certain international presence. This is expressed in various fields, like 
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the agreements on Cooperative Security. In this regard, it should be noted the 
changing international situation after the 9/11 attacks, which ended 
“securitizing” the agenda in Latin America due to the influence exerted by the 
United States. In addition, the new transnational threats put the region on alert 
and encouraged cooperative agreements on the subject. 
 When reviewing the bilateral agreements between the two countries 
during the Alianza administration, we are faced with a history linked to the 
MERCOSUR: the cooperation between Argentina and Brazil regarding to the 
problem of the Triple Frontier. In the words of Martínez and Tibiletti, the 
measures carried forward “(...) took away the ghost of a so-called lawless area, 
which could serve as a pretext for foreign intervention in the region” (2009, 
231). With respect to this issue, collaborative spaces were maintained, such as 
the creation of the Coordination Center of Police Training (Centro de 
Coordinación de Capacitación Policial, CCCP, in Spanish). 
Turning to bilateral agreements of strictly nuclear nature, we note that 
the Joint Declaration that creates the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for 
Applications of Nuclear Energy (Agencia Argentino Brasileña de 
Aplicaciones de la Energía Nuclear, ABAEN, in Spanish), signed on August 
14, 2001, opened a new chapter in the relationship of both countries by 
enhancing cooperation in nuclear applications, such as the nuclear fuel cycle, 
production of radioisotopes, management of radioactive waste and participation 
in the development of innovative technology for power generating reactors. 
The short and unstable government of Fernando De la Rúa also saw its 
difficulties reflected on the field of nuclear cooperation with Brazil. After 
several interim presidents, the arrival of Kirchnerismo will strengthen, not 
without shocks, ties with Brazil, and will extend the bilateral mechanisms 
directed towards the formation of a process of cooperative security. 
There are several agreements on security between the two countries due 
to the political affinity between both governments. On August 15, 2003 the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and 
Brazil was signed in Asuncion. Its aim was to reaffirm the commitment to 
disarmament and non-proliferation, the promotion of commercial and non-
commercial cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to initiate 
consultations with a view to developing joint projects in the framework of space 
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programs, development of satellites and other common interests, and to deal 
with the Argentine participation in future activities of the Alcântara Center. 
Furthermore, it approaches the beginning of consultations aimed at the co-
production of aircraft and aeronautical equipment. Under these assumptions, 
the exchange of scientific, industrial and commercial technical information was 
developed. 
Two years after the Memorandum, it was time for the Framework 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defense between Argentina and Brazil 
signed in Puerto Iguazú on November 23, 2005, which aims to strengthen 
political defense cooperation through the exchange of experiences in designing 
and managing defense policies and actions in the area of planning, budget 
management, research and development, logistic support and procurement of 
defense products and services. 
On 30 November of the same year, the Joint Declaration on Nuclear 
Policy of Puerto Iguazu is materialized. Both presidents renewed their historic 
commitment to the Declaration of Iguazú, highlighting the importance of a 
broad set of new protocols and cooperation instruments, including the Joint 
Declaration on Nuclear Policy as a highlight. 
The need to define potential joint projects led to the Framework 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence between Argentina and Brazil 
on February 22, 2008. This agreement includes nuclear cooperation, 
infrastructure, energy and defense, and it consists of other 17 agreements. It 
aimed constituting binational subcommittees for strategic projects under the 
framework of the joint working group in order to undertake actions aimed at 
developing cooperation in research, development and joint production in the 
area of defense. 
In the 2010 Declaration of San Juan, Cristina Fernández and Lula da 
Silva highlighted the successful independent implementation of comprehensive 
safeguards by ABACC and the IAEA for more than fifteen years. The heads of 
state signed a series of agreements, including one on nuclear cooperation to 
launch a project of reactors, one for each country, for the shipbuilding industry 
and medicinal uses. Fernandez claimed that both countries are convinced of the 
right to develop nuclear energy projects under the non-proliferation framework, 
for peaceful and alternative energy purposes only. 
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On January 31, 2011, in the context of the official visit of Dilma 
Rousseff to her counterpart Cristina Fernández, an agreement by which the 
CNEA and CNEN will jointly build two research reactors was signed. They also 
ratified the Joint Presidential Declaration on Nuclear Policy signed in San Juan 
in its entirety and encouraged the political dialogue established in the Standing 
Committee on Nuclear Policy (Comité Permanente de Política Nuclear, CPPN, in 
Spanish), in order to continue the exchange of information on the status of both 
countries’ nuclear programs, coordination of positions in international forums, 
such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), among others, and the political 
assessment of bilateral nuclear cooperation and the functioning of ABACC, in 
order to enhance its role. 
On 5 September of the same year, the Joint Declaration of the Ministers 
of Defense Arturo Puricelli of Argentina and Celso Amorim of Brazil was signed. 
They reaffirmed the importance of the strategic relationship on defense and 
celebrated the launch of the Vice-ministerial Strategic Political Mechanism for 
Dialogue (Mecanismo de Diálogo Político Estratégico Viceministerial, MDPEVM, 
in Spanish). Under the purpose of deepening the political-strategic dialogue and 
cooperation in defense, the maintenance of South Atlantic as a Peace Zone free 
of nuclear weapons was established. Furthermore, they worked on the 
coordination of positions on the prospects for the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), on cooperation of the Armed Forces in 
Peacekeeping Operations, on coordination of positions and actions in the ambit 
of the UNASUR South American Defense Council and other forums, and on the 
strengthening of a joint program of exercises. Bearing in mind the intention to 
cooperate in technology and production, it was considered to advance in terms 
of shipbuilding, aerospace equipment and computer science. It is clear the 
multidimensionality of security cooperation. 
Once these bilateral agreements were described, it is clear that 
cooperation is also given in order to avoid an energy crisis. This topic is of great 
significance for two economies that need to diversify its energy matrix. In the 
case of Brazil9, nuclear energy accounts for 3% of current energy generation, 
and in Argentina, 7%. But the bilateral cooperation is not enough to achieve 
                                                 
9 Today, Brazil relies on hydroelectric energy for 91% of its energy supply. 
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the “energy goals”, since they depend on other projects and most experienced 
nuclear partners willing to make a technology transfer. 
 Another factor to be considered is the growing strategic influence and 
the opportunity for both countries to become global participants of the nuclear 
fuel market. From a geopolitical perspective, these circumstances would help 
Brazil to strengthen its leadership at regional and global levels. The active 
participation of Brazil in the creation of UNASUR and its proposal for the 
creation of a South American Defense Council are two indicators of this state’s 
intention to achieve regional leadership. In addition, Brazil has demonstrated a 
sustained effort to expand its influence outside the region, either through the 
campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, their 
participation in rapidly developing economies (BRIC ) along with Russia, India 
and China, or its intention to partner with selective developed countries in 
selective international projects on nuclear fusion, such as the ITER (originally, 
the international consortium for the International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor). 
The control over sophisticated nuclear technology provides an 
international prestige aspired by both Brazil and Argentina. The latter has had 
a Latin American nuclear leadership for a long time, but that leadership was 
lost due to successive political and economic crisis. Under the circumstances, it 
seems that Argentina is a very suitable partner for Brazil since it has the know-
how, it is not competing for leadership and apparently considers the consortium 
as a good opportunity to reactivate its decayed nuclear program. This strategic 
alliance could also turn Brazil and Argentina in global suppliers of enriched 
uranium and advanced reactors of intermediate power. 
From a the non-proliferation standpoint, a bilateral business conducted 
by two democratic countries without regional conflicts, and operating under the 
effective control of international organizations such as the ABACC and IAEA 
offers much more guarantees than independent projects developed in isolation. 
In any case, nuclear alliances should be based on transparency and be developed 
under close monitoring by the international community in order to extend this 
process of cooperative security. 
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4. By way of Conclusion 
The particularities of the different governments in both sides of the border often 
hampered the consolidation of integration processes, but the bilateral 
cooperation was overall stimulated during the negotiations analyzed in our 
work. The government of Raúl Alfonsín, in spite of the many difficulties faced 
due to the stage after Falklands War, the instability of the political system and 
the severe economic crisis, could make cooperative gestures to Brazil that can 
be observed by the number of signed agreements and visits paid by both 
presidents. These decisions led to the creation of Confidence Building Measures 
between the two states on security. 
The advent of neoliberalism in the region conditioned the regional 
cooperation to the principles of market economy, although it was not drifted 
away from the agenda. The various initiatives, including MERCOSUR, were 
bounded to trade liberalization, isolating any deeper political alliance proposed. 
However, there was a boost for the adhesion of Argentina and Brazil to the 
large international regimes governing separate nuclear developments and the 
utilization of nuclear energy. At different speeds, both countries adhered. 
The political and economic destabilization suffered by Argentina in the 
late-1990s shows its correlation in the scarcity of agreements with Brazil to 
deepen the process of Cooperative Security, a situation that began to turn 
during the government of Néstor Kirchner. 
This path led to a gradual and cumulative increase in the weight of 
conflict prevention components, which also greatly expanded the scope of 
cooperative relations between the two states. Thus, it is possible to appreciate 
the importance and significance of the experience of bilateral cooperation in the 
sector, which involved the development of a functional common policy to build 
mutual trust and a security process, both essential for the construction of a 
relatively successful integration process and for a healthy consolidation of a 
democratic regime in the region. Cooperative security is a process that finds its 
natural habitat in democracy. The recovery of the institutions promoted 
regional integration in many areas. The economic and trade cooperation, 
represented by MERCOSUR, along with the various bilateral agreements were 
pioneer, generating a set of policies and shared visions also reflected in the 
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ambit of security. A complex ambit, especially between two countries that have 
a history of distrust and rivalry. 
Argentina and Brazil led a transformation process of their relations, 
from the tension of military rule to the approach in times of restoration of 
democracy, and then to a political, economic and strategic alliance that began 
in the 1990s and has been consolidated since 2003, at least from a discursive 
point of view. 
Both Argentina and Brazil were pioneers in nuclear technology in the 
region, which somehow led to active cooperation with their neighbors. 
However, the model of autonomous nuclear development that characterized the 
1980s was replaced by that of self-restraint and external controls in the 1990s, 
in response to external pressures. Finally, during the presidential terms of Lula 
and Kirchner a part of the autonomous margin in nuclear development was 
recovered, and this has led to some scuffles with international monitoring 
bodies. Despite the ambitious nuclear program presented by the Argentine 
president, it is Brazil that carries out the most important developments in the 
nuclear field in this period. 
We believe that Argentina and Brazil have actually started an 
irreversible path towards Cooperative Security. Besides, they have intensified 
their bilateral ties in other areas, making regional integration a 
multidimensional dynamic. Without actions or decisions that build trust and 
transparency, it is impossible to advance in other agreements. In short, in the 
words of Brigagão (2011. Our translation.): “Argentina and Brazil created a 
political, diplomatic and technical architecture through a very good and 
sophisticated articulated system based on confidence-building cooperation”. 
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ABSTRACT 
The article applies the Cooperative Security approach to the bilateral relation 
between Argentina and Brazil through the development of Confidence-Building 
Measures as elements that generate mechanisms of long-term cooperation. The 
aim is to review bilateral cooperation in the nuclear field. 
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